Safety Advisory Committee

April 5, 2013 1:30 – 3:00 PM

Minutes

Committee Member	Representing	Present
Anderson, Erik	Materials Sciences Division	X
Bello, Madelyn	Human Resources Advisor	
Blodgett, Paul M.	Environment, Health and Safety Division	X
Bluhm, Hendrik	Chemical Sciences Division	
Christensen, John N.	Earth Sciences Division	X
Dardin, Steve	Physics Division	*
Floyd, Jim	Safety Advisory Committee Chair	
Franaszek, Stephen	Genomics Division	X
Fujikawa, Brian	Nuclear Science Division	*
Giuntoli, Patricia	Computing Sciences Directorate	
Lunden, Melissa	Environmental Energy Technologies Division	
Martin, Michael C.	Advanced Light Source Division	X
More, Anil V.	Office of the CFO Advisor	
Sauter, Nicholas	Physical Biosciences Division	X
Seidl, Peter	Accelerator & Fusion Research Division	X
Taylor, Scott E.	Life Sciences Division	X
Tomaselli, Ann	Information Technology Division	
Tucker, Eugene	Facilities Division	X
Thomas, Patricia M.	Safety Advisory Committee Secretary	X
Wong, Weyland	Engineering Division	X

Others Present: Lee Aleksich, Allen Benitez, Richard DeBusk, Joe Dionne, Julie Drotz, Ross Fisher, Mary Gross, Howard Hatayama, Bruce King, Michael Kritscher, Nancy Rothermich, Mike Ruggieri, Andreas Schmid, Ann Tomaselli, Bill Wells, *Marty White (for Physics and NSD)

<u>General Comments – Scott Taylor</u>

- Gift equipment Divisions are being asked to fill out safety reports for gift equipment with unknown hazards. The Safety Advisory Committee and Environment, Health, Safety, and Security Division (EHSS) need to talk about this issue.
- Lab fit-out Glenn Kubiak will talk about this topic at a future meeting
- Peer reviews The safety peer review for Nuclear Science Division has been completed. The review for Engineering Division is getting ready to start.

 Controlled substances -- Purchases of controlled substances must go through Procurement. Nancy Rothermich is working on a communication plan. LBNL does not have a controlled substances program that meets University of California guidelines and expectations. The Safety Advisory Committee will be working with EHSS and Security to develop the program, There will be future discussion about this topic.

Requirements Management Pipeline - Bill Wells

The following policies are in the process of development:

- Engineered nanoparticle medical surveillance -- Preliminary management approval, need significance rating analysis and implementation plan from Subject Matter Expert (SME).
- Continuity of Operations Plan -- Preliminary management approval, draft policy with SME to finalize, plan being drafted by the SME not expected until 10/13.
- Reporting of NFPA health hazard 3+ materials to emergency management -- Preliminary management approval; have significance rating analysis and implementation plan; need text and location.
- **Electrical equipment** -- Preliminary management approval, policy and program drafted, working group review.
- Lockout-Tagout -- Working group established, and drafting revised program. Significance rating analysis and implementation plan expected in May/June.
- Radiation safety -- Conversion to Radiation Control Manual format, and addition of new requirements from DOE O 458.1 CH. 2. Significant change for Lab radiological clearance and release program. Radiation Protection Group is working with the Radiation Safety Committee on requirements, language and format of Radiation Control Manual. Need significance rating analysis and implementation plan.
- EHSS urgent call response -- Procedure documenting how EHSS will receive and respond to urgent calls for assistance and how information will be documented. Significance rating analysis completed.
- PUB-3000 reformatting -- Management approval, ~20 Policies and ~40 Programs to be completed. Program is on track. Chapter 1 has been posted.
- Parking and traffic
- Fire protection
- Vehicle accidents
- Contract requirements The contract between DOE and UC will reference the regulatory requirements rather than LBNL implementing implementation policies.

Risk Management Initiatives

Biosafety - Mike Martin

Work involving biohazards has been categorized into Work Planning and Control hazard levels 1, 2, and 3. The categorization was approved March 14. The next step is to look at potential policy changes, such as viability, level of containment, permit requirements, toxins or select agents produced in experiments. There is a distinction between hazardous chemicals that are purchased and biotoxins produced in experiments. The policy approach may change before the Work Planning and Control system is fully implemented.

Low-Level Radiation – John Christensen

The Radiation Safety Committee did not discuss this topic at their meeting. Jim Floyd, Larry Phair, and David Kestell will be meeting to discuss. There have been some changes to DOE release and clearance requirements that affect thresholds between waste management levels. LBNL is looking at how to implement the changes. The new requirements are more prescriptive, but clearer. LBNL is looking at what other National Labs are doing.

Issues Management / Corrective Action Tracking System (CATS) – Howard Hatayama

The Issues Management program is broader than CATS. Howard Hatayama is starting a dialogue to discuss the whole process. There should be two tiers of response, one for high priority issues that require formal systems, and one for low risk concerns that may be tracked in other ways. The current system does not encourage tracking of low-level concerns. LBNL also needs a way of assessing risk and identifying issues of institutional issues. The goal is to have a system of value to the institution and Divisions. The Issues Management process needs to be defined before the CATS tool can be fixed. The Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) is running in parallel and generates issues for tracking. Issues can arise in many ways, including self-assessments. Sometimes the perception of risk can change as more information is learned about an incident, and the system needs to be able to reflect the changes.

<u>Traffic Safety – Andreas Schmid</u>

Andreas Schmid has been working with the UC Haas School of Business Center for Catastrophic Risk Management and the LBNL Traffic and Pedestrian Safety Committee to develop ideas on how to reduce the risk of workplace fatalities from traffic accidents. The risk of death from traffic accidents is significant – it is the highest cause of death after major diseases, and the #1 cause for people under 40 years of age. Almost half of workplace deaths (and all LBNL work-related fatalities) are from traffic accidents.

There is a misconception that more signs and markings will always result in more safety. Systems should be adapted to the psychological and physical conditions of use. Traffic safety is a shared responsibility between system designers and users. Examples of common problems at LBNL include:

- Roundabout design According to federal traffic standards, yield signs
 would be more appropriate than stop signs. This is reflected in how
 drivers actually use the roundabout they rarely come to a full stop unless
 they see another vehicle, pedestrian, or bicycle approaching. Federal
 design standards also say that the crosswalk should not go through the
 center of the roundabout.
- "Share the Road" LBNL roadways are only about 10 ft. wide. Federal standards call for 12-14 ft. lanes. There is not enough room for cars and bicycles to share a lane safely. Vehicles cross the double yellow lines when passing bicycles to give the bicycles more room, which is safer but technically illegal. One way to address the problem would be to remove the centerline between lanes. People actually tend to drive more carefully and logically when there are fewer markings. We could also consider establishing a traffic pattern of one-way roads (outer ring with cross connections) with bicycle and pedestrian lanes.

The path forward could include:

- · Bringing in a technical expert;
- Inventorying existing conditions;
- Exploring and benchmarking other systems of sharing space.

<u>CHESS Development – Injury Review Process -- Ross Fisher and Lee</u> <u>Aleksich</u>

The new process decouples the injury review process from the OSHA classification process. The level of review is tailored to need. Line management is represented by the supervisor's review and concurrence. OSHA and DOE contract requirements drive the 7-day reporting window. The information needed for OSHA is obtained during patient intake at Health Services. The investigation can take up to 14 days. The investigation process includes a team with flexible composition, collaborative report development, and quality review. The injury review system does not communicate directly with the ORPS system.

The information technology platform (CHESS) to support the injury review process will be up and running soon. Beta testing started 2 weeks ago. User acceptance testing is expected to start in about 2 weeks. Division Safety Coordinators (DSCs) and EHSS Liaisons will receive training and guidance. DSCs and investigators will have access to the system. The system will include Integrated Safety Management (ISM) analysis. The accident / injury notification system is separate. Corrective actions developed from investigations are not linked directly to CATS.

The meeting was adjourned at 3:15 PM Respectfully submitted, Patricia M. Thomas, SAC Secretary